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An enduring legacy of Darwinian theory, beside the small 
detail of offering a mechanism for how living things evolve 
(i.e., natural selection), is that there is no reason to advocate 
a designer to explain the complexity of living things (Darwin, 
1859). Not only does the demand for a designer beg the 
question “who designed the designer,” it also overlooks the 
fact that systemic elements, given time, form on their own a 
complex structure (Dennett, 1995). A superfluity of empiri-
cal findings has established that evolution is an irrefutable 
fact. An avalanche of scientific discoveries, from the laws of 
physics to the principles of astronomy, have been consistent 
with the idea of a universe evolved over billions of years 
rather than a universe created less than 10,000 years ago 
(Dawkins, 2009). There is seemingly no purpose to the uni-
verse, intercessory prayer is no more effective than chance, 
and religions—at least in their popular form—are, it has 
been argued, irrational, contradictory, pathological, illusory, 
exploitative, and potentially dangerous (Dawkins, 2006; 
Freud, 1927/1961b; Harris, 2004; Hitchens, 2007; Leuba, 
1925; Marx, 1843; Skinner, 1953).
Yet organized religion and religiosity (i.e., beliefs and 
practices related to a supernatural agent) are prevalent. 
Worldwide, 85% of people report having at least some form 
of religious belief (Zuckerman, 2005), and 82% report that 
religion constitutes an important part of their daily life 
(Crabtree, 2009). In the United States, 94% of respondents 
express a belief in God, 82% state that religion is at least 
fairly important to them, and 76% consider the Bible the 
actual or inspired word of God (Gallup, 2009). In contrast, 
only 15% worldwide describe themselves as nonreligious, 
agnostics, or atheists (Zuckerman, 2005). If anything, athe-
ists are strong and frequent targets of prejudice (Edgell, 
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006).
Why, then, does religion persist in the face of Darwinian 
theory and evidence, scientific facts, secular arguments, and 
name-calling? Biologists, sociologists, anthropologists, politi-
cal scientists, philosophers, historians, and journalists have 
taken turns in answering this question (Atran, 2002; Berring, 
2006; Blackmore, 1999; Bloom, 2005; Boyer, 2001, 2008; 
Burkert, 1960; Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006; Durkheim, 
1912/1995; Hinde, 1999; Sloan-Wilson, 2002). However, 
despite early interest in the topic (Allport, 1950; G. S. Hall, 1917; 
James, 1902; Leuba, 1925; Skinner, 1953; Starbuck, 1899), an 
increasing presence (Emmons & Palouzian, 2003; Exline, 2002; 
Kirkpatrick, 2004; Smith, McCullough, & Poll, 2003), and calls 
to take the study of religion seriously (Baumeister, 2002; 
Emmons, 1999; Gorsuch, 1988), mainstream psychology has 
been conspicuously absent from the party.
There are at least four reasons for this absenteeism. In 
classical psychoanalytic theory, religion was regarded as an 
expression of neurosis and a defense mechanism against 
anxiety (Freud, 1927/1961b, 1930/1961a). As such, religion 
was not deemed worthy of inclusion in major theories of per-
sonality (Koltko-Rivera, 2006). Also, academic psychology 
(unlike most other disciplines) has assigned high prestige to 
the study of processes or mental entities (e.g., perception, 
learning, memory) and has denigrated the study of life 
domains (e.g., sex, food, work; Rozin, 2006). Religion quali-
fies as a life domain rather than a process and has thus been 
frowned on, if not shunned from inquiry, by the discipline in 
general and by leading psychology academic departments in 
particular. Moreover, academics are largely nonreligious, a 
pattern anticipated by the negative correlation between edu-
cation and religiosity (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2008). Being 
exposed to like-minded colleagues, academics may form the 
false impression that religion is a rather rare and marginal 
phenomenon (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). The final reason 
smacks of a minor conspiracy theory. Academics may have 
perceived religiosity as a private matter, one that defines 
people with strong and passionate feelings either in favor of 
or against it. Thus, the majority of academics may have left 
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this topic to the discretion of those few highly religious or 
highly antireligious researchers. This pattern, in turn, may 
have tainted the study of religion and religiosity as poten-
tially biased and as jeopardizing the objectivity of scientific 
scrutiny (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985).
In the past few years, however, there have been clear signs 
that psychology, and in particular social and personality psy-
chology, is abandoning this somewhat insular attitude. Now, 
an increasing number of researchers are conducting cutting-
edge research on religiosity. Recent world events (e.g., 9/11), 
the positive psychology movement, and the intensification of 
the age-long debate between religious and secular circles have 
all contributed to this change of hearts. Religiosity—an orien-
tation, behavioral set, and lifestyle considered important by 
the large majority of people worldwide—cannot be neglected 
by social and personality psychology any longer.
This special issue attempts to capture the zeitgeist of this 
explosion of interest in religiosity by providing a vibrant 
forum for an exchange of ideas and, thus, greater participa-
tion of social and personality psychology in an ongoing and 
societally relevant debate. The special issue explores the 
potential of social and personality psychology theories to 
account for the phenomenon of religiosity (including, but not 
limited to, belief in supernatural agency). Social and person-
ality psychologists have a reputation as theory builders. 
What is it that all those years of powerful theorizing have to 
offer? What do the data have to say? The objective of the 
special issue, then, is to use existing and well-established 
theory, coupled with supportive empirical evidence, to 
explain the phenomenon of religiosity in all its complexity 
and heterogeneity. All aspects of religiosity (e.g., different 
religions as practiced by different cultures) are fair targets 
for dispassionate analysis, debate, and inclusion.
Special issue articles share four commonalities. First, 
they ask “why” questions. Why is religiosity so important to 
so many people? Why is religiosity important to some people 
and not to others? What are the functions that religiosity 
serves? Second, they take a theoretical approach. Contribu-
tions draw from established theories to understand and 
explain diverse aspects of religiosity. Third, they focus on 
social and personality psychological approaches to religios-
ity. Finally, they try to accomplish several specific tasks: 
(a) to outline the theory that underlies their argument, (b) to 
provide selected empirical demonstrations of the theory’s 
veracity from the social/personality psychological literature, 
(c) importantly, to discuss empirical findings that are directly 
linked to the phenomenon of religiosity, and (d) to draw 
implications for future empirical pursuits.
Gray and Wegner (IN PRESS) open up by examining 
perceptions of a supernatural agency. They argue that people 
perceive God as possessing agency but not experience. God 
is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity that people 
blame for their misfortunes and praise for their fortune. Their 
theoretical analysis explains such curious phenomena as 
strengthening one’s faith in God in the presence of 
suffering.
The next five articles take a functional approach to religios-
ity. They argue in favor of specific motive or need driving 
religious belief and practice. Sedikides and Gebauer (IN 
PRESS) meta-analytically test the idea that the self-enhancement 
motive underlies religiosity (intrinsic, extrinsic, religion-as-
quest). They show that both macro-level culture (countries 
varying in religiosity) and micro-level culture (U.S. universities 
varying in religiosity) moderate the self-enhancement–religios-
ity link. The positive relation between self-enhancement and 
intrinsic religiosity is stronger, and the low or negative relation 
between self-enhancement and extrinsic religiosity or religion-
as-quest is stronger (i.e., more negative), the higher the culture 
is on religiosity. Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, and Nash (IN 
PRESS) zero in on the motive for control. They propose that 
religion serves as a means for preserving the belief in an orderly 
world, especially when other relevant structures fail to satisfy 
the motive for control. They demonstrate that experimentally 
induced low levels of personal control elevate belief in God or 
spiritual forces. They also review evidence showing that, when 
the stability of external control structures (e.g., government) is 
threatened, religious belief increases. Granqvist, Mikulincer, 
and Shaver (IN PRESS) maintain that religious beliefs satisfy 
relational concerns and in particular attachment needs. The rela-
tionship with God is an attachment relationship and is especially 
beneficial to individuals who are insecurely attached. Ysseldyk, 
Matheson, and Hymie (IN PRESS) and Hogg, Adelman, and 
Blagg (IN PRESS) view religion as a group phenomenon. 
Ysseldyk et al. propose the motive for a positive social identity 
as an explanation for religiosity. Identification with social 
groups entails benefits but also costs, as when it is threatened by 
intergroup conflict. Hogg et al. posit that uncertainty reduction 
not only underpins religiosity but also influences conformity 
with religious leaders, which may culminate in immoral behav-
ior. Vail et al. (IN PRESS) emphasize the terror management 
functions of religiosity. It reduces death anxiety, as it serves to 
provide people with psychological equanimity in the face of 
death awareness.
Koole, McCullough, Kuhl, and Roelofsma (IN PRESS) 
grapple with a paradox. How can religious persons have rela-
tively high levels of emotional well-being when they often 
endure aversive experiences or forsake pleasurable ones? 
Their answer is that religion facilitates an implicit form of 
self-regulation that allows both striving for high standards 
and maintaining emotional well-being. Their theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence address a related para-
dox, namely, the tenacity of irrational aspects of religion. 
This irrationality, though, is more seeming than real, as it 
confers vital psychological benefits in promoting implicit 
self-regulation.
In a meta-analysis and a narrative review, Saroglou (IN 
PRESS) sketches the religious personality: Religious individu-
als are high on Agreeableness and Conscientiousness but low 
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on Openness to Experience. These findings contextualize the 
contributions by D. Hall, Matz, and Wood (IN PRESS) and 
Graham and Haidt (IN PRESS). In a meta-analysis, Hall et al. 
show that religious individuals are racist to the extent that the 
belief systems of religiosity and racism share the values of 
social conformity and respect for tradition. Graham and Haidt 
highlight the social side of religiosity by suggesting that reli-
gion is mainly founded on the group-focused values of in-group 
or loyalty, authority or respect, and purity or sanctity. Their 
theoretical proposals can explain such rather puzzling phenom-
ena as why most people are religious worldwide, why religious 
persons are more charitable than nonreligious ones, and why 
religious individuals are happier than nonreligious ones.
Religiosity is a complex, multiply determined phenome-
non. Capitalizing on social and personality psychology 
theory, the special issue offers a nonexhaustive but fairly 
representative portrait of the landscape featuring social and 
personality psychology and religiosity. The special issue 
emphasizes process-oriented explanations of religiosity that 
take into account individual differences. This emphasis 
promises to strengthen the coherence of theorizing and 
research on religiosity. It is hoped that the special issue will 
elucidate the phenomenon of religiosity per se, challenge 
and expand social and personality psychology theories in 
novel ways, bring social and personality psychology to the 
forefront of explanations for religiosity, and build bridges 
and a healthy dialogue between social and personality psy-
chology perspectives and other approaches to religiosity. 
The ultimate hope is that each article will prove generative, 
provide fodder for future empirical directions, and spark 
research on religiosity.
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